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The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies to prosecutions in
the federal courts and to state prosecutions through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.1 This constitutional right is probably
the least favorite of the Bill of Rights, because it would satisfy most
defendants if the government never—promptly or otherwise—disposed
of their pending charges. One group of persons, though, who may regard
the right to a speedy trial as important are convicted defendants currently
serving sentences, but who have pending charges brought against them
by other states or the federal government. For them, denying the right to
speedy disposition of their pending charges can seriously interfere both
with the nature and length of their incarceration.

*
1.

Frost Brown Todd Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1967).
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While Smith v. Hooey received no attention from the general public,
corrections officials and the American prison population at the time
hoped that it symbolized more certainty in sentencing and correctional
programs for men and women who return to society after prison life.2
Although the decision has had a partial benefit for prisoners through the
near-unanimous ratification of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
(IAD),3 the Supreme Court and lower courts have refused to extend the
decision to include all prisoners who live with the uncertainty of pending
charges.4
I. THE POLICY FAVORING PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CHARGES
Undoubtedly, there is a public interest in protection from recidivist
criminals who deserve imprisonment for a maximum period of time.
There is also a public concern for effective correctional treatment of inmates
not serving life sentences so that they can return to their communities as
useful citizens. When an inmate is serving a sentence in one jurisdiction
and is charged in another (either with additional crimes or parole or
probation violations), public protection and inmate rehabilitation can
succeed by resolving the other charges quickly.
The reality is otherwise. The prosecuting authority in the other state is
often satisfied to file a detainer against the inmate and wait until the end
of the current sentence before pursuing the additional or revocation charge.
The latter approach usually makes effective correctional treatment during
the first sentence more difficult. As the former Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons noted:
[I]t is in their effect upon the prisoner and our attempts to rehabilitate him
that detainers are most corrosive. The strain of having to serve a sentence with
the uncertain prospect of being taken into the custody of another state at the
conclusion interferes with the prisoner’s ability to take maximum advantage of
his institutional opportunities. His anxiety and depression may leave him with little
inclination toward self-improvement.5

While the detainer is pending, the inmate may be ineligible for some
correctional programs requiring a lower security classification. Worse,
sometimes prosecutors never pursue the new charge, producing neither
effective treatment nor prolonged incarceration.
2. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
3. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. app. at 1520 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 734 (1985) (holding the IAD
inapplicable to revocation detainers); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976) (holding
that defendant has no right to speedy parole revocation hearing for lodged but unserved
detainer).
5. James V. Bennett, “The Last Full Ounce,” FED. PROBATION, June 1959, at 20–
22.
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In addition to the harmful effect of detainers on security classification,
multijurisdictional offenders are more likely to serve longer prison terms
than if they had committed the same offenses in one jurisdiction. The
sentencing judge in the first state is “apt to view the violation of its laws
in isolation and demand full satisfaction, while if all the offenses were
tried together, the court, in fixing the sentence, could more easily consider
the relation of the particular criminal to the entire series of offenses.”6
Another harmful effect of detainers is that parole boards automatically
deny parole to inmates with detainers or at least consider the detainer as
a negative factor in the parole-granting process.7 Moreover, an inmate
aware of an unfiled charge may decide not to prepare a parole plan
because notice of the new charge will arrive at the prison eventually.
II. THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF DETAINERS
More than a generation before Smith v. Hooey, lawmakers began to
express concern about crime control in a mobile society. In the Crime
Control Consent Act of 1934, Congress endorsed state “agreements or
compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention
of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and
policies . . . .”8 Congress recognized the need for effective crime control
without jurisdictional impediments, as well as its authority to legislate in
this area:
The rapidity with which persons may move from one State to another, those
charged with crime and those who are necessary witnesses in criminal proceedings,
and the fact that there are no barriers between the States obstructing this
movement, makes it necessary that one of two things shall be done, either that
the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal Government shall be greatly extended or
that the States by mutual agreement shall aid each other in the detection and
punishment of offenders against their respective criminal laws.9

A Joint Committee on Detainers met in 1948 to discuss the legislative
need for standards to ensure the return of inmates wanted for trial or
revocation proceedings elsewhere. With the Council of State Governments
serving as the secretariat for the Committee, it called for cooperation
6. Note, The Detainer: A Problem in Interstate Criminal Administration, 48
COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1192 (1948).
7. See Note, Convicts—The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer
Statutes, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 828, 835 (1964).
8. 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2000).
9. S. REP. NO. 1007 (1934); H.R. REP. NO. 1137 (1934).
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among judges, the police, and prosecuting officials.10 Two years later, the
Committee discussed a draft of an interstate additional charge detainer
compact.11
The IAD is an interstate compact to facilitate the speedy disposition of
new charges by one jurisdiction against a prisoner who is serving a sentence
in another jurisdiction. Prior to its enactment, there was no mechanism
to obtain custody of a prisoner before her term of imprisonment ended in
another state. Under the IAD, when a charging jurisdiction files a
detainer against a prisoner elsewhere, she must be promptly notified of
the detainer and of her right to demand trial.12 There are two ways for
the new charges to be resolved under the IAD. First, the detainer
process can be initiated upon demand of the prisoner, who must then be
brought to trial within 180 days after she has demanded a trial.13 The
IAD may also be instituted upon demand of the prosecutor, who must
bring the prisoner to trial within 120 days after she is returned to the
jurisdiction where the charges are pending.14 Failure to hold a trial within
these periods will result in dismissal of the charge, unless an appropriate
court has granted a continuance.15
Before Smith v. Hooey, the prejudicial effect of denying a speedy trial
to a person imprisoned in another jurisdiction and the beneficial effects
of the IAD were well understood among scholars and correctional
officials.
A convict is subject to the anxiety of a pending charge, and his defense is equally
jeopardized by bringing him to trial after serving a long sentence when his
witnesses may be unavailable. In fact, prejudice to the convict’s defense may be
increased because an imprisoned defendant “is less able on that account to keep
posted as to the movements of his witnesses, and their testimony may be lost
during his continual confinement.” Moreover, to deny speedy trial to a defendant
already serving a sentence inflicts upon him an additional punishment not levied
by the formal judicial process.16

10. LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, CRIMINAL DETAINERS 91–92 (1979).
11. One proposed section for the IAD, providing that all detainers must be filed
before the sentence was imposed on the first charge (apparently to make it possible for
the court to impose concurrent sentences), was ultimately rejected as too restrictive
because of the difficulty in completing investigations in time to decide whether to charge
before sentencing in the first case. In addition, the proposal could result in detainers being
filed even if the inmate received an adequate sentence in the first case. ABRAMSON,
supra note 10, at 92.
12. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. III(c) (2000).
13. Id. art. III(a).
14. Id. art. IV(c).
15. Id. arts. IV(e), V(c).
16. Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587, 1607 (1965)
(quoting Arrowsmith v. State, 175 S.W. 545, 546 (Tenn. 1915)).
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In addition, if a criminal charge remains pending until a sentence elsewhere
is completed, the possibility of concurrent sentencing is lost.17 However,
even with this ongoing dialogue among scholars and correctional officials,
the lower courts were split on the speedy trial requirement.18
Despite the understanding about why a detainer mechanism was
needed, by 1969 the IAD had been adopted by fewer than half the states.
It took the Supreme Court’s call in Smith v. Hooey for good faith, diligent
efforts to speedily prosecute inmates in other jurisdictions for state legislatures
and Congress to act quickly to adopt the IAD as a means of implementing
the Court’s mandate.
III. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF SMITH V. HOOEY
In March 1960, Richard M. Smith was serving a federal sentence in
Leavenworth, Kansas when he and a codefendant were indicted by a
Texas state grand jury for theft by false pretext.19 Six weeks later,
Smith’s prison warden received notification from Texas that a state
arrest warrant was pending.20 The notice also inquired about Smith’s
minimum release date, which the warden determined to be January
1970.21
As early as November 1960, Smith sent a pro se motion for a speedy
trial to the Texas trial court.22 As the trial judge acknowledged, for the
next six years Smith “by various letters, and more formal so called
‘motions’, . . . asked either for a speedy trial or dismissal of the
indictment.”23 The last of his motions to dismiss was apparently filed in

17. Bennett, supra note 5, at 20–22; Paul M. Schindler, Interjurisdictional Conflict
and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 179, 182–83 (1966); Note, Effective
Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.J. 767, 770
(1968).
18. Compare State v. Heisler, 390 P.2d 846, 848 (Ariz. 1964) (endorsing a speedy
trial right for the incarcerated inmate in another jurisdiction), and Barker v. Mun. Court,
415 P.2d 809, 815 (Cal. 1966), and Richerson v. State, 428 P.2d 61, 66 (Idaho 1967),
with Ford v. Presiding Judge, 167 So. 2d 166 (Ala. 1964) (no obligation to provide a
speedy trial), and Ex parte Schechtel, 82 P.2d 762, 765 (Colo. 1938), overruled by
Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544, 548 (Colo. 1985), and Petition of Norman, 184 A.2d
601, 601–02 (Del. 1962), and Evans v. Mitchell, 436 P.2d 408, 412 (Kan. 1968).
19. Brief for the Petitioner at 4–5 n.1, Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (No.
198).
20. Id. at 5 n.2.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 5 n.3.
23. Id. at 5 n.4.
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April 1967, but as usual the trial court failed to rule. A year later, Smith
sought a writ of mandamus from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
which lacked jurisdiction over such matters, but which forwarded the
motion to the Texas Supreme Court.24 That court quickly denied his
petition, relying on its own precedent that a state has no obligation to
provide a speedy trial to a defendant who is in the custody of another
sovereign.25 In August 1967, Smith filed a petition for certiorari, which
was granted ten months later.26
Charles Alan Wright, a leading authority on the federal courts and a
Professor of Law at the University of Texas Law School, represented
Richard Smith in the United States Supreme Court.27 In his brief,
Professor Wright powerfully noted that, under Texas law, Smith’s
legal rights were a function of his location.
If petitioner [Smith] had been at large for the last eight-and-a-half years,
and his requests for a trial had been refused, it could hardly be doubted that he
would have been denied his constitutional right. If he had been in custody in a
Texas prison on some other state charge, the fact of that custody would not
relieve the prosecuting authorities from their duty to give him a speedy trial.
This is explicitly recognized in Texas . . . as it is by most jurisdictions.28

IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN SMITH V. HOOEY
Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court,
first noting the traditional purposes of the constitutional speedy trial
guarantee: “[1] to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to
trial, [2] to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation
and [3] to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of
an accused to defend himself.”29 He then described the added burdens
for a prisoner who has pending charges in another jurisdiction.
At first blush it might appear that a man already in prison under a lawful
sentence is hardly in a position to suffer from “undue and oppressive
incarceration prior to trial.” But the fact is that delay in bringing such a person
to trial on a pending charge may ultimately result in as much oppression as is
suffered by one who is jailed without bail upon an untried charge. First, the
possibility that the defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at least
24. Id. at 5 n.5.
25. Id. at 5. The Texas Supreme Court relied on Cooper v. State, 400 S.W.2d 890,
892 (Tex. 1966), where the United States Bureau of Prisons’s willingness to make
Cooper available for trial was of no significance to the Texas Supreme Court. In
Lawrence v. State, 412 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. 1967), the court reaffirmed Cooper.
26. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 5–6; Smith v. Hooey, 392 U.S. 925
(1968).
27. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 374 (1969).
28. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 19, at 8.
29. Smith, 393 U.S. at 378 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120
(1966)).
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partially concurrent with the one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the
pending charge is postponed. Secondly, under procedures now widely practiced, the
duration of his present imprisonment may be increased, and the conditions
under which he must serve his sentence greatly worsened, by the pendency of
another criminal charge outstanding against him.
And while it might be argued that a person already in prison would be less
likely than others to be affected by “anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation,” there is reason to believe that an outstanding untried charge (of
which even a convict may, of course, be innocent) can have fully as depressive
an effect upon a prisoner as upon a person who is at large . . . .
....
Finally, it is self-evident that “the possibilities that long delay will impair the
ability of an accused to defend himself” are markedly increased when the
accused is incarcerated in another jurisdiction. Confined in a prison, perhaps far
from the place where the offense covered by the outstanding charge allegedly
took place, his ability to confer with potential defense witnesses, or even to keep
track of their whereabouts, is obviously impaired. And, while “evidence and
witnesses disappear, memories fade, and events lose their perspective,” a man
isolated in prison is powerless to exert his own investigative efforts to mitigate
these erosive effects of the passage of time.30

When a prisoner demands a speedy trial by the charging jurisdiction,
that sovereign has “a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith
effort to bring him before the . . . court for trial.”31 The charging
jurisdiction’s lack of authority to compel the defendant’s return for trial
does not excuse the obligation to grant her a speedy trial. To achieve the
letter of the holding, the Court also stressed increased cooperation
between the states and between the states and the federal government.32
While the Court emphasized the need for prosecutors to make a “diligent,
good-faith effort” to bring defendants elsewhere to trial, it did not
mandate prosecutors to file detainers as soon as they became aware of
the defendant’s location. The prosecutor could avoid the IAD’s intended
effect by not filing a detainer until the defendant’s custodian was about
to release her, because the IAD lacks a timely filing requirement.

30. Id. at 378–80 (quoting Bennett, supra note 5, at 21).
31. Id. at 378. The holding means that the four-part balancing test of Barker v.
Wingo applies to Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis for prisoners charged in another
jurisdiction. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). The Barker factors are the length of the delay
from the earlier of arrest or indictment until trial, the reason for the delay, whether the
defendant demanded a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant as a result of the
delay. Id.
32. Smith, 393 U.S. at 381–82 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723 (1968)).
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V. THE LEGISLATIVE REACTION TO SMITH V. HOOEY
Smith v. Hooey is an example of an underrated Supreme Court
decision because fewer than half of the states had ratified the IAD before
1969.33 Seizing on the Court’s speedy trial mandate and the Court’s
encouragement for interjurisdictional cooperation, within ten years every
state but Louisiana and Mississippi had enacted the IAD.34 Increasingly,
more prisoners could use the IAD to demand speedy resolution of
additional charges in other jurisdictions because both the custodial state
and the charging state were IAD signatories.35 Of comparable importance,
when Congress considered and approved the IAD for federal and District
of Columbia prosecutions in 1970,36 it clearly stated that the authority
for the IAD originated in the 1934 Crime Control Consent Act.37 Eleven
years after Smith, the Court clearly ruled that the “construction of an
interstate agreement sanctioned by Congress under the Compact Clause
presents a federal question.”38 The Court also appeared to say that even
though a particular interstate agreement is not one that requires congressional
consent under the Compact Clause, Congress “transforms the States’
agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause” if Congress has
authorized the agreement and the subject of the agreement is an
appropriate subject for congressional legislation.39
VI. THE JUDICIAL AFTERMATH
Having elevated the IAD to an available remedy for vindicating
speedy trial rights as well as to a federal question, it was natural for later
litigants to seek Supreme Court expansion of the IAD’s scope.40 However,
33. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1018, at 3 (1970); S. REP. NO. 91-1356, at 3 (1970).
34. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1389–1389.8 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 941.45 (West 2006); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 580.20 (McKinney 1995).
35. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 226, 231 (Ct. App.
1967).
36. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397
(1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at 1520 (2000).
37. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1018, at 3 (1970); S. REP. NO. 91-1356, at 3 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4864, 4866.
38. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981).
39. Id. at 440.
40. Since Cuyler, the Supreme Court has decided other IAD-related cases. See
Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 151–52 (2001) (holding violation of the IAD’s
prohibition on returning an individual transferred to another jurisdiction for trial to the
sending State before trial is completed requires dismissal of charges); New York v. Hill,
528 U.S. 110, 115 (2000) (holding right to trial within the 180-day period may be waived
by counsel without the defendant’s express consent); Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52
(1993) (holding 180-day period under the IAD does not begin until a prisoner’s request
for final disposition is delivered to the court and prosecutor); Carchman v. Nash, 473
U.S. 716, 734 (1985) (holding revocation detainers are outside the scope of the IAD).
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the Court balked at opportunities to expand the rights of prisoners to
dispose of other types of pending charges, disregarding the rationales for
prompt disposition it found so compelling in Smith. The litigants should
have foreseen the Court’s reluctance to expand the IAD to revocation
detainers.
Just as Smith’s untried charges potentially thwarted his—and his
warden’s—interests in his rehabilitation, revocation detainers equally
harm prisoners, depriving them of possible concurrent sentences,
complicating their treatment programs, and increasing the difficulties of
defending the revocation allegations. The Court had previously held that
due process requires prompt hearings to revoke probation or parole, but
the triggering mechanism for that right was taking the probationer or
parolee into custody.41 Seven years after Smith, in an intrajurisdictional
context, the Court held that a federal parolee, who was imprisoned for a
federal crime committed while on parole, was not constitutionally entitled
to a speedy parole revocation hearing when a parole violator warrant was
issued and lodged as a detainer with the institution of his confinement but
not served on him for ten years.42
If the Court was disinterested in giving speedy disposition status to a
parole violation detainer within the same legal system, it was highly
unlikely that it would be willing to extend the reach of the IAD to
revocation detainers across state borders.43 Following Smith v. Hooey,
only one legislature expressly amended the IAD to apply to revocation
detainers, 44 and lower court cases indicated that the IAD, without
41. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1972).
42. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 80–81, 86 (1976).
43. Courts have restricted the application of the IAD in four ways. First, the IAD
does not require that a detainer be filed within a certain time or at all. See, e.g., State v.
Ayers, 143 P.3d 251, 265 (Or. App. 2006). Second, the IAD does not require dismissal
of the untried charge when an inmate’s custodian fails to promptly notify the prosecuting
officials of the charging state about the inmate’s request for final disposition of the
charges. See, e.g., Odhinn v. State, 82 P.3d 715, 722–23 (Wyo. 2003). Third, the IAD
does not apply to a person in pretrial confinement, awaiting a disposition of his charges,
because he is not “serving a term of imprisonment.” See, e.g., United States v. Paige,
332 F. Supp. 2d 467, 472 (D.R.I. 2004) (collecting cases recognizing that the IAD is
inapplicable to pretrial detainees); Painter v. State, 848 A.2d 692, 701 (Md. App. 2004).
Finally, the IAD does not apply to inmates who have been convicted in another
jurisdiction but not yet sentenced. See, e.g., State v. Bates, 689 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Iowa
App. 2004) (collecting cases).
44. In 1976, the Kentucky General Assembly amended the IAD, providing in
section 440.455 of the Kentucky Code: “All provisions and procedures of KRS 440.450
shall be construed to apply to any and all detainers based on unheard, undisposed of, or
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legislative amendment, was inapplicable to revocation detainers. The
broad view was that the IAD applied to any inmate “who is serving a
term of imprisonment,” while the narrow interpretation confined the IAD
to inmates with “any untried indictment, information, or complaint,” thereby
excluding pending revocation charges from the IAD’s coverage.45
In Carchman v. Nash, the Supreme Court addressed whether the scope
of the IAD included parole and probation violation detainers, as well as
additional charges.46 The Court held that the IAD does not apply to
revocation charges, even though the Court’s definition of a detainer covered
the revocation context.47 Turning the Smith rationale on its head, the
Court noted that delay before revocation would actually be advantageous
to the prisoner and the court that hears the revocation charge. First,
delaying the revocation hearing provides more information about the
prisoner’s progress toward rehabilitation. Second, the uncertainties associated
with an additional charge detainer are greatly reduced for revocation
detainers, because the revoked prisoner is often sentenced to serve the
full term of the suspended sentence.48 Because the Court did not view
the effect of a revocation detainer as being as severe as an additional
charge detainer, it was unnecessary for the Court to interpret the IAD
language broadly to include revocation charges.
VII. CONCLUSION
Smith v. Hooey recognized that an inmate in another jurisdiction needs to
be protected by the right to a speedy trial even more than other
defendants. When the Court confirmed what both corrections professionals
and inmates had known about the effects of pending charges, most states
enacted the IAD. As suddenly as the Court had appeared willing to
consider speedy disposition rights for all inmates with pending charges,
it soon restricted its concern about delay to untried charges under the IAD.
unresolved affidavits and warrants charging violations of the terms of probation and
parole.” S.B. 356, 1976 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1976). In 1990, five years after
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985), the Kentucky legislature repealed KRS
440.455. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 440.455 (repealed 1990).
45. See, e.g., Clipper v. State, 455 A.2d 973, 975 (Md. 1983), superseded by
statute, MD. CODE ANN. § 645A(a)(2)(i), as recognized in Smith v. State, 694 A.2d 182
(1997); Padilla v. State, 648 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Ark. 1983); State v. Knowles, 270 S.E.2d
133, 134 (S.C. 1980); Suggs v. Hopper, 215 S.E.2d 246, 247 (Ga. 1975).
46. Carchman, 473 U.S. at 719.
47. A detainer is “a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in
which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the
agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent.” Id. (citing
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 436 n.3 (1981)). Article I of the IAD is clear that it
applies to all situations in which an inmate faces pending charges in another jurisdiction.
48. Id. at 732–33.
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More than three decades later, the only remedy for inmates and corrections
professionals would be an unlikely, explicit extension of the IAD’s scope to
include revocation charges.
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